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LIVING IN A WORLD OF «MORAL STRANGERS»
Over and over again, we are told and agree that, although there is no serious
lack of moral conviction and orientation in our cultural communities, we are
confronted with a plethora of competing moral positions and ethical endeavours.
While in urgent need of commonly mastering vital problems in various fields of
shared interest, we seem to be living together as « moral strangers»2 with no
chance of constructing a sufficiently detailed value system and ensuing normative
rules, which would offer us a path to tackle those problems with the hope of
lasting success.
The complaint about the absence – at least an overscarcity – of mutually
affirmed and binding moral and legal rules3 has been officialised: The European
Council has been heading for a minimal set of common values and obligations in
pressing problem areas such as biomedical research and practice4. While experi-
encing limited success, the Council had to pay the price of remaining rather
general and evading queries where consensus could not be reached. The European
Union issued directives, e.g. on patenting living substances5, which remained
contested, lead one of its member states to launch a law suit (eventually lost in
court), and are still far from being generally transposed into national legislation6.
1 The term «scientific» is used here in a broad sense, including natural and social sciences,
medical scientists, engineers and scholars (the community of the humanities).
2 H.T. Engelhardt, Bioethics and Secular Humanism. The Search for a Common Morality.
London and Philadelphia 1991, XI, XIV. Cf. the whole Introduction for a quick and comprehensive
orientation.
3 For a telling, though biased example see George Weigel’s critique of secular Europe
renouncing the very heart of its cultural tradition supporting human dignity, human rights, the spiritual
humanism, and democracy: the Judeo-Christian heritage (G. Weigel, «The Spiritual Malaise that
Haunts Europe», Los Angeles Time, May 1, 2005.
4 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human
Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine. Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine. Oviedo, 4.4.1997 (European Treaty Series 164). The work of the Convention is work in
progress. A recent achievement in this continuous effort is the Additional Protocol to the Convention
of Human Rights and Medicine Concerning Biomedical Research, Strasbourg, 25.1.2005.
5 European Commission, Directive 98/44/EG, Brussels, 1998.
6 We must not, however, overlook the efforts the European Union has been making, particularly
in the last few years, to establish generally recognised values and norms. Its most fundamental  
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PROMOTING A WORLD
OF MORAL RELATIVES.
A CHALLENGE
FOR THE SCIENTIFIC1 COMMUNITY
What has been experienced on the European level is but an echo of the
everyday struggle for ethical and political understanding and co-operation in the
particular European countries – i.e. nations and cultural areas featuring interna-
tional as well as intranational differencies which seem to make the mere quest for
a European and universally shared moral and legal area a utopia. In any case, it has
become doubtful whether the traditional democratic procedures still offer an
effective path out of this akward situation7.
Many of the normative controversies characteristic of the present historical
situation are due to scientific achievements and discoveries, and to technological
advances. They have been changing what we consider reality, and traditional
images of the world and the human being have been altered8. Out of the new forms
of understanding ourselves and the world we live in, emerged unexpected possi-
bilities, interests, and objectives of forging both of them. However, these interests
and objectives are far from being unanimously welcomed. There exists an obvious
clash between traditional and newly acquired concepts and attitudes, to such an
extent that peaceful co-existence within and between our societies has been put
under heavy additional stress. Thus, looking for common ethical procedures,
moral attitudes and standards has become a major concern of the socially, politi-
cally, culturally and, to some extent, also economically competent and responsible
actors : institutions as well as individuals, amongst them the overarching organi-
zations alluded to, viz. the European Community and the Council of Europe.
Global bodies are engaged, too, in the first place the United Nations Organization
with its precarious efforts of having the human rights respected all over the world.
Think of the actual controversy about institutionalising a new Human Rights
Council with the USA’s rather arrogant efforts to shape this important interna-
tional initiative according to their convenience, if not to simply send it to the
bottom.
initiative is the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its introduction into the draft Euro-
pean Constitution – even if this draft was finally rejected by two of the member states, and therefore is
not valid today. Since more than twelve years, a European Group on Ethics in Science and New Tech-
nologies has been issuing Opinions to the European Commission, e.g. on Ethical Aspects of Clinical
Research in Developing Countries (no 17, February 4, 2003). In 2001, the Commission established a
Science and Society Action Plan which also included a strong ethics component in putting responsible
science at the heart of policy making. This plan is now part of the still running 6th Framework
Programme (FP6) of the EU project of creating a European Research Area (part of a Communication
by Rainer Gerold, in a paper he gave at the Amsterdam Conference on « Common Values in the Euro-
pean Research Area», organized by ALLEA, the European Federation of National Academies of
Sciences and Humanities (May 20/21, 2005).
7 Cf. R. Dahrendorf, Die Krisen der Demokratie. Ein Gespräch, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2002,
101 f., 103 f.
8 A prominent example has been provided by the efforts and the achievements of the neuro-
sciences leading, amongst others, to the contention that human free will were but an illusion. Cf.
G. Roth, Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert, Frankfurt am Main,
Suhrkamp, 2001, p. 453. W. Singer, Ein neues Menschenbild? Gespräche über Hirnforschung, Frank-
furt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2003, p. 24-34, particularly p. 32 f.
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THE QUEST FOR ETHICAL CONSENSUS
AND COMPROMISE
Science, technology, and scholarship with their personal and institutional
actors are among the leading factors responsible of the «postmodern predica-
ment»; and since their performances and products are no longer a priori and
generally saluted as a wished for progress, and promise of general wealth and
happiness9, they are also among the first to be hit by the demand of engaging in the
quest for existential meaning and moral orientation. Their representatives, in the
first row their academies and professional associations, perceived and after some
time accepted that demand, turning it into one of their prominent responsibilities.
They have been realising their responsibility in various ways, particularly on
two separate though indissolubly related tracks. The first consists in submitting
scientific and scholarly practice to ethical critique and moral regulation10; the
second in elaborating the specific responsibilities of those pertaining to the scien-
tific and scholarly communities in looking for ethically acceptable ways of
meeting the challenges of present day societies, of humanity at large11. On both
tracks, though in different ways, they have been striving after universal normative
arrangements. A third track they followed should not been overlooked, i.e. the
direct political engagement when faced with stirring violation of the principle of
human dignity, more precisely of human rights12, particularly the right to free
scientific and scholarly activity and communication. Lately a forth track has
become dominant, with the public discussion – and sometimes heavy protest –
9 G. Ropohl, Ethik und Technikbewerbung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1996, chapter 1.
10 E.g. European Science and Scientists Between Freedom and Responsibility. A Conference
organized by ALLEA, the European Federation of National Academies of Sciences and Humanities,
ed. by P. D. J. Drenth, J. F. Fenstad, and J. D. Schiereck, Luxembourg, European Communities, 1999.
Cf. also the annexes in Technik und Ethik, ed. by H. Lenk and G. Ropohl, Stuttgart, 1987, p. 311-363;
Medizinische Ethik im Alltag, ed. by A. Bondolfi and Hj. Müller, Basel/Bern, EMH Schweizerischer
Ärzteverlag, 1999, p. 435-587; W. Shea and B. Sitter(-Liver), Scientists and Their Responsibility,
Canton MA, Watson Publishing International, 1989; G. Berthoud and B. Sitter-Liver, The Responsible
Scholar. Ethical Considerations in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Canton MA, Watson
Publishing International, 1996 (The last two publications were issued on behalf of the Conference
[today the Council] of the Swiss Scientific Academies).
11 In 2003, ALLEA published a Memorandum on Scientific Integrity. On standards for scientific
research and a National Committee for Scientific Integrity (NCSI). Cf. also the Bibliography, p. 21 f.
In 2002, the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences had already decided on and published a respective
set of guidelines and norms, cf. Integrität in der Wissenschaft. Richtlinien der SAMW für
wissenschaftliche Integrität in der medizinischen und biomedizinischen Forschung und für das
Verfahren bei Fällen von Unlauterkeit, Basel, 2002. Cf. again the Bibliography on p. 19 f. The Council
of the Swiss Scientific Academies (CASS) had also been active on the international level, see e.g.
«Sustainable Development Futures: A selection of Swiss Academic Perspectives», ed. by B. Sitter-
Liver et al., in Our Fragile World: Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Development. A
Forerunner to the Encyclopedia of Life Supporting Systems, Oxford UK, EOLSS Publishers, 2001,
p. 2153-2173. A separate edition was published by CASS under the title Supporting Life on Earth, ed.
by B. Sitter-Liver, G. Bächler, A. Berlinger-Staub, Bern, 2001. Note that these are but a few examples
out of an impressive series of codes, analyses, and declarations issued on different organizational
levels and throughout the world.
12 E.g. the Human Rights Network.
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in view of morally and ethically controversial scientific and technological
advances13; it is taking the role of ethical consultants to authorities of different
kinds as well as to firms, often by insisting on the prevalence of scientific truth
and by claiming particular ethical competence in the public debate, though not
rarely on rather swampy grounds.
STRENGTHS, OMISSIONS, AND FAILURES
The national academies and particularly their international umbrella organiza-
tions had and still have a prominent role to play in this endeavour of creating
universal ethical understanding and moral practice. Not directly depending on
economic interests or political ambition, they stand the test as stronghold of inde-
pendence, at least in the double sense of reflecting possible vested interests and
dependencies, and of allowing critique and neutralization of such dependencies
within their domain. By their very terms of reference, they ought to be and as a
rule are motivated to open the field for controversial discourse, aiming at clear,
enlightened, and reflected advice to third parties, the general public, and more
particularly to social, economic, and political decision-makers. In this they have
been providing unique achievements allowing the solution of urgent problems in
the general and thus truly public interest. And yet, there remain at least two
domains in which the scientific and scholarly communities are still far behind of
what would have been one of their intrinsic obligations.
Decades ago, Charles Percy Snow deplored the grave gap between what he
termed the literary intellectuals and the scientists – the representatives of the
humanities, the empirical social and the natural sciences, as we might put it today,
still in a rather reductionist way14. That gap has not yet been filled, notwith-
standing the notorious demand of inter- and transdisciplinary co-operation. Quite
to the contrary, we experience the imperialism of the language of science15, partic-
ularly of the so-called life sciences. And the gap was even carelessly jumped over
by the contention that the new and truly third culture would be formed by scien-
tists with philosophical competence, leaving aside the knowledge and wisdom
gathered by the traditional humanities16.
An important part of the difficulties we face when engaging in the quest of
ethical understanding seems to stem from cultural differencies inherent in the
overall scientific system and causing deafness where open ears, intellectual alert-
13 Take human therapeutic and reproductive cloning or research on human stem cells as just two
examples.
14 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and a Second Look, London/New York, Cambridge University
Press, 1969.
15 J. Anderegg’s expression. Cf. also his study «Zur Legitimation und zur Wissenschaftlichkeit
der Literatur- und Sprachwissenschaften », in Kulturwissenschaften und Perspektiven, ed. by
J. Anderegg and E. A. Kunz, Bielefeld, 1999, p. 83-92.
16 J. Brockmann, Die dritte Kultur. Das Weltbild der Naturwissenschaft, München, W. Goldmann,
1996; cf. the Introduction, p. 15-35 (The English original The Third Culture was published a year
before (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1955.)
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ness, and curious hearts were needed. The academies of arts and sciences have still
a long way to go in their firm, it is true, attempt to better that harmful situation17.
This failure is at the roots of another and commonly known difficulty with
which science in particular is confronted, i.e. the replacement of the exuberant
belief in the goodness of scientific progress by scepticism and even contempt for
scientific and scholarly achievement (though usually accompanied by mostly
unconscious or at least unreflected use of and everyday pleasure in countless such
achievements). The phenomenon is notorious under the heading of fading accep-
tance of science in society. It is less familiar as the lack of acceptance of societal
needs and positions by science. Both science and society (a separation which is
itself purporting a gap that is not acceptable in the light of systems theory, nor in
sociological and economic, not even in epistemological critique) stand up against
each other with expectancies and demands as if they were autonomous entities
with legitimate claims, instead of acknowledging their mutual pervasion and
entwinement. Too many scientists still think that the general public needs one-
way enlightenment about what they do, and that then the problem of trust would
be dissolved. True communication would mean, however, accepting mutual
critique and advice, and honouring different and maybe not easily reconcilable
interests. Here, too, the academies and analogous scientific and scholarly bodies
are confronted with an important task that needs modesty as well as competence.
Striving after an understanding in fundamental moral and ethical queries either
produced by science and scholarship, or being their research object, would
certainly form an essential element in building a common vessel of truth, trust,
and peace for a successful trip on uncertain waters.
Main concerns of today’s societies, nay humanity, should stand in the fore-
ground of such endeavours. They are commonly well known, and should encom-
pass global challenges, such as the fight against poverty and hunger, and the
ensuing need to reexamine and eventually modify the rule of actual economic
systems with their theories; ecological deterioration of the globe; decent water,
housing, and energy supply for everybody, but particularly for the less privileged;
control of overall population growth. They ought to include problems created by
biomedical development such as human cloning and genetical engineering of
living substances, with their ensuing economically driven patenting issues. These
are but a few examples of the many globally relevant concerns waiting for thor-
ough co-operative investigation by scientists and scholars and the innumerable
professional institutions. And they are of high social, cultural, and political rele-
vance, on national, regional, and global levels.
Needless to stress that generally stopping science and scholarship would not
result in any favourable and fruitful solution. Yet both science and scholarship do
need guidance springing from two equally important sources: firstly emerging from
within the scientific and scholarly cultural project of humanity, and secondly stem-
ming from outside, offered by societal and imposed by political entities situated at
various levels. However, the prerequisite of any successful guidance are values
shared by the scientific and scholarly community and, in the end, by the universal
community of – if not moral friends, then at least – moral relatives. This may sound
17 Cf. J. P. Snow (note 14).
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quite utopian to many ears, particularly of those of the all too prudent and clever
pragmatists. Yet it outlines an ideal that we must not dismiss if we sincerely care
about true mutual understanding and generally life supporting peace and solidarity.
DIFFICULTIES TO OVERCOME
The quest for shared values – entailing universally accepted norms – has to
count with a number of serious difficulties. They must be explicitly faced and
handled so as to save the quest from ending in a vague and «abstract utopia»18. I
shall briefly address three of these difficulties.
The first difficulty is of a theoretical nature. It dwells in the controversy about
universally acceptable normative arrangements; in the doubt whether these are at all
possible and, if so, desirable. The postmodern interpretation of our world has
become notorious: We are living in culturally surroundings where there are no more
any generally binding moral instances19. The search for meaning and orientation has
become individualised; the ethical teaching that, in principle, every interest must be
taken seriously on its own ground, is now a truism; the quest for at least a
«minimum concept of natural law»20 has seen itself being reduced to the very
general, thus abstract demand never to use a fellow human as a mere means21; to the
contention that the accepted minimal significance of the concept of human dignity
is given by the person’s right not to be degraded and humiliated22, and to accept that
the idea of symmetry precedes that of asymmetry23. In political discourses as well as
in the notorious self-assertion accompanying almost naturally activities of intercul-
tural encounter, the possibility and the acceptability of a universally adequate and
obliging interpretation of the notion of human dignity has been theoretically ques-
tioned, while its non-universalizability has been dramatically affirmed on practical
grounds. Insisting on the indisputable validity of intracultural, particularly intrareli-
gious rules, provides just one of the most telling examples24.
The second difficulty deepens the first one. It concerns by far not only, yet
particularly scientific and scholarly associations proud to stress their independence
18 E. Bloch, Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie I, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1965,
p. 124-132.
19 Cf., for many, Dahrendorf 2002 (note 7), p. 104. It is a scandal, Svend Andersen, president of
Societas Ethica said in August 2002, that the plurality of options in ethics has been accepted.
20 H. L. A. Hart, The Conception of Law, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1961, p. 189-195.
21 E.g. H. T. Engelhardt (note 2) ; E. Tugendhat, «Gibt es eine moderne Moral?», Zeitschrift für
philosophische Forschung, Nr 50, 1986, p. 323-338, both echoing I. Kant.
22 P. Balzer, K.-P. Rippe, and P. Schaber, Menschenwürde vs. Würde der Kreatur, Freiburg/
München, Karl Alber, 1998, p. 28-31.
23 E. Tugendhadt (note 19), p. 334-336.
24 Today’s newspapers and magazines are full of striking examples; I do not think I need to cite
any of them. However, I cannot help but highlight firstly again the USA in their pragmatic contradic-
tion when claiming to be the worldwide guarantor of the human rights, while at the same time, with
reference to so-called national interests, trampling those very rights underfoot ; secondly the daily
lunacy of asking to kill and of killing hundreds and thousands of not involved and innocent human
beings under the pretence of securing a particular human right or a indefinite number of those rights.
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as political consultants. Science and technology are not a world of their own but part
of what has been named the socio-economic-technological system25. Scientific and
technological research and development are to a high degree controlled by private
enterprises and therefore driven by economic interests and boundary conditions.
Public statistics tell us that an important part and in some countries, like
Switzerland, more than half of the funds invested in pure and applied research is
spent by the private sector. It is not an irrational guess to hold that freedom of
research, one of the highly praised human or fundamental rights is generally (sic)
very limited under such conditions. The same applies to publicly funded research
since such research has to support the country’s competitive position, and the
apparently obvious needs of the political community. Freedom of research is one
of the major arguments put forward by politicians and scientists when
programmes and projects are confronted with public controversies. Yet it seems
that such defense is usually highly interest driven, and it calls another suspicion:
that it serves to make one overlook, dismiss, or forget to what important extent
research activities are in fact commissioned work, determined and thus limited by
mostly economic, but also societal, political, and even military preferences26.
When I maintained that this was also true for publicly promoted research and
development, then I did so considering that their determining policy is usually
fashioned by respective private lobbying. It is neither a secret nor astonishing that
societal expectations together with personal ambitions influence even the so-called
fundamental or non-oriented research. Being part of that complex system with its
manifold interrelations and network processes, the scientific and also the scholarly
associations are far from being independent of the social, political, and economic
struggles. If they issue ethical guidelines and codes of ethical conduct for their
professional communities – a pedagogical and ordering function of high signifi-
cance – their statements cannot be considered as if they were universally accept-
able by nature. The fact that infringements may be politically and economically
successful and then become firstly excused, later legitimate, is a proof : Represen-
tatives of the Swiss National Science Foundation arguing successfully that the
rhythm of research advances is superior to the one of political decisions, provides
an actual example27. In June 2005, this argument was echoed by the majority of the
Swiss National Parliament voting the legal status of pre-implantation diagnosis, in
contradiction to its former legal dispositions28. In January 2003, Christopher
Reeves had provided another telling example. He related trials on human para-
plegic subjects by use of the so-called therapeutic cloning. Asked to provide more
details he refused to do so on the ground that scientific progress needed peer-
review and other internal measures before it could and should be made public29.
25 G. Ropohl, Technologische Aufklärung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1991, chapters 1 and 5,
part., p. 118.
26
«Sometimes, the scientific community is behaving like a cartel. Only more dangerously.»,
R. Dahrendorf (note 7), p. 107 (author’s translation).
27 The Foundation did so in defense of its decision to finance a research project using imported
human embryonic stem cells while production of those cells in the country is forbidden on constitu-
tional and legal grounds.
28 Cf. «Forschung ist Politik weit voraus», Der Bund, 16 Juni, 2005, p. 11.
29 Sidney, Reuters 24.1.2003, cf. Science et Cité Newsletter, Bern, 4.2.2003.
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Yes, there are examples demonstrating the opposite : the public unmasking of
major infringements of rules and good scientific practice, and the heavy conse-
quences of those guilty of such moral crimes. The sudden fall of the South Korean
«national hero» Hwang Woo Suk, a cloning expert, is probably the most recent
prominent example30. But such internationally disseminated cases are rare; prob-
ably, they are covering a reality which the respective community prefers to veil.
Setting personal experiences aside, the many well documented and commented
cases of blunt fraud and crime within that community and its military and political
environment provides an acceptable ground for such a suspicion31.
The normative statements of academies and professional associations are them-
selves often enough fruits of material and rhetorical compromise. They ought to be
critically analysed and interpreted, i.e. submitted to an open discourse reaching
beyond their confines, and indispensable for assessing and assuring their potential
universality. In short, ethical statements of scientists, scholars, and their institutions
are far from being truly authoritative; they are but one voice, though a highly
meaningful one in the general strive for normative orientation within society.
The third difficulty flows from the second. As elements of the socio-
economico-technological system, scientists and scholars depend on its processes
and interrelations. Being functional, they can be used. And since power relations
are inherent to the system, they may be abused. Where abuse meets their proper
interests, corruption may ensue. This is not a secret either. Ralf Dahrendorf gave
an apt description of what is at stake, in one of his recent interviews, resuming
what many authors had already displayed: Scientists must not be left alone. Their
ways of pursuing their proper interests and of defending their convictions are
often dogmatic and sometimes misleading. Since in all important ethical ques-
tions an economic interest may – and frequently does – come into play, « there will
always be a scientists who can be bought»32. Of course, this does not mean that
buying always plays a role where scientific and scholarly controversies appear.
Striving after truth necessarily implies critique and controversy. However, while
dissents and public controversy among scientists and scholars are set, processes of
ruling them out by powerful, sometimes institutionalised mainstream positions
are also evident. Sociologically speaking, this is again neither extraordinary nor
astonishing. But it encumbers ethical contributions and positions as well as formal
statements of individual scientists or their corporations with a mortgage.
SCIENTIFIC AND SCHOLARLY ACHIEVEMENTS,
IMPACT, AND OBLIGATIONS
In spite of those difficulties and often aware of them, scientists, scholars, and
their institutions were successful in coming to terms with moral and ethical chal-
lenges.
30 Cf. « Klon-Forscher Hwang als Fälscher entlarvt», Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr 301, 24/25
Dezember 2005, p. 19.
31 Cf. e.g. S. Loue, Textbook of Research Ethics. Theory and Practice, New York, Kluwer Acad-
emic/Plenum Publishers, 1999, chapter 1.
32 R. Dahrendorf, 2002 (note 7), p. 107.
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Experiencing moral and in general cultural development, very often induced by
the growth of scientific knowledge and technological competence, they considered
their normative activity as work in progress and in consequence reviewed and modi-
fied their former findings and statements when need was at hand. The work on inter-
national ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects
provides a telling example. Starting with the «Doctors’ Trial» at Nuremberg in 1947,
an intensive process of reflection, formalised decision-making, and reviewing lead to
the joint CIOMS’33 and WHO’s 2000 edition of the respective guidelines34. They are
exemplary in that they not only give voice to scientific expertise and interest, but
explicitly integrate universal political and thus societal reflection and development.
They ground their essential concepts on human concern of true universality and in
consequence provide a solid platform for tackling controversial concretization and
application. This prominent example is by no means unique. Together with compa-
rable guidelines issued by national and international professional bodies, it proves
that the hope of overcoming difficulties and achieving viable universal norms
through the endeavour of scientists and scholars is a reasonable one.
The Opinion of the European Group on Ethics and New Technologies (EGE),
issued on 4 February, 2003, has been providing a respective testimony giving rise
to legitimate hope. The Opinion deploys « Ethical Aspects of Clinical Research in
Developing Countries». Not only does EGE ground its considerations on the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights (28.9.2000), particularly «on the indi-
visible and universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity»,
but it also enumerates the fundamental principles it has been recognizing since its
beginning, maintaining that they are universally accepted. Among them, we come
across the principle of respect for human dignity and the principles of non-
exploitation, non-discrimination, and non-instrumentalization; the principle of
individual autonomy; the principle of justice and the principle of beneficence and
non-maleficence; the principle of proportionality, « including that research
methods are necessary to the aims pursued and that no alternative more acceptable
methods are available», and others35 The quest for generally acceptable ethical
principles is not only without any hope, but has been successful. Even if we
should maintain that this is true only on the general level, we have to admit that
unanimity regarding principles remains a necessary condition for any more
concrete ethical, moral, and as a result political understanding.
At this point, we must turn again to the undeniable fact that scientific, schol-
arly, and technological achievements are fashioning – to a decisive degree – our
images of ourselves and of the world we are living in. An actual example has been
provided by the recent findings within neurobiology and brain research, relevant
to and highly questioning traditional concepts of freedom of will, autonomy, and
responsibility – and therefore touching our expectations with relation to ethics and
moral education36.
33 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) and World Health Orga-
nization (WHO).
34 CIOMS, Geneva, 2002.
35 Cf. paragraphe 2.2, «General Approach», of the above cited Opinion.
36 Cf. G. Roth and W. Singer (note 8).
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The forming power to determine other essentials of human existence – the
term of essentials being understood in a broad sense, including the natural condi-
tions not just of human life, but of life in general – entails, at least for reasonable,
i.e. morally open beings the obligation to participate in the endeavour of moral
orientation and ethical critique. The public investment in the education and in the
activities of individual scientists, scholars, and engineers as well as their
frequently privileged social position, transform it into an irredeemable moral duty,
resulting in the obligation to at least some form of political engagement.
CONCLUSION
Though the outline on which I have ventured is not more than a sketch, it
makes it clear that working for a world of moral relatives is not without any
dangers and even pitfalls. This applies not least to those adhering to the scientific
and scholarly community. But it has also been shown that sincere efforts are being
made by that community to meet the challenge, and that those efforts can be
successful. For all those assuming the moral point of view (and whoever is asking
moral respect from others has done so and is bound by the ethico-logical interdic-
tion to succumb to the pragmatic contradiction), such a situation turns into a moral
obligation – into the moral duty not to break with their engagement to commonly
search for and eventually establish principles and norms destined to be shared by
whoever is of good will and reasonable.
Yet the sketch also displayed that we cannot satisfy ourselves with remaining
just moral relatives. The challenges of today’s socio-economic, technologically
and scientifically driven civilization are forcing us into more, if we truly wish to
control the cultural conditions we have been creating. There are at least some
fundamental values and principles we need to share, and be it only out of a vital
interest to create and assure for each of us a solid basis for difference, dissent, and
controversies37.
Meeting that challenge, the scientific and scholarly community contributes to
moral understanding within society at large, hopefully also on a global level. This
hope is not a void utopia but, in the sense of Ernst Bloch, a concrete one38 and
therefore, again, an ideally driven duty we ought not to dismiss as long as we stick
to the overarching ideal of being a moral, i.e. a universally oriented subject
striving after what is good in itself. This, then, would result in sincerely honouring
and truly preserving human dignity.
Departement der Philosophie
Universität Freiburg
beat@sitter-liver.ch
37 Cf. B. Sitter-Liver, « Skepsis als Praxis. Zur Grundlegung der praktischen Philosophie»,
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Nr 48, 1994, p. 372-396.
38 E. Bloch (note 17), p. 124-132.
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